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IMPLICATIONS OF BUCKHANNON BOARD AND CARE
HOME) INCORPORATED V. WEST VIRGINIA

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES
FOR DUE PROCESS UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
2
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT

1

I. INTRODUCTION
On May 29, 2001, the United States Supreme Court decided
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Incorporated v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources. In yet another 5-4 split, a the Court determined that for purposes of fee4
shifting statutes such as the Fair Housing Amendments Act
and the Americans with Disabilities Act,~ a party must now secure an enforceable judgment or a court-ordered consent decree
to recover attorneys' fees as the "prevailing party." A defendant's voluntary change after a suit is filed is no longer enough
to recover as it "lacks the necessary imprimatur on the
,6
ch ange.
"Numerous federal statutes allow courts to award attor7
neys' fees and costs to the 'prevailing party."' And, traditionally, courts have held that simply being the catalyst to change
was enough to be deemed a "prevailing party" under the catalyst theory.
Critics of the Buckhannon decision argue that the ruling
8
"doesn't offer much assistance to civil rights lawyers." These
1. 5:~2 U.S. 59R, 121 S. Ct. 1R35 (2001).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (West 2001).
:1. "In all, one-third of the term's cases (26 of 79) ended in 5-4 rulings. Washington, D.C., lawyer Thomas Goldstein, who tracks the statistics, says this is the highest
percentage of fi-4 rulings in more than a decade." David G. Savage, United They Sit,
ABA .Tournai :14, :14 (Sept. 2001).
4. 42 U.S.C. § :l60l et seq. (West 2001).
5. 42 U .S.C. § J 21 01 et seq. (West 200 I).
6. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1810.
7. Jd. at 18:-Js.
R. Margaret Sanner & Carl Tobias, Shifting Winds: Court Whittles Away at
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critics believe that the decision "will frustrate plaintiffs' efforts
to recover attorney fees in litigation seeking to vindicate impor9
tant societal values, such as the prevention of discrimination."
While no federal due process cases show definite implications of Buckhannon under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), a federal fee-shifting statute, there are
inevitable consequences for school districts in suits filed
against them under IDEA Glimpses of such consequences can
be seen in the two Buckhannon citing IDEA cases: J.S. & M.S.
0
v. Ramapo Central School Districti and Jose v. Joliet Township High School District 204. II
This paper examines the Buckhannon decision, the history
of attorneys' fees legislation pursuant to IDEA, and the application of Buckhannon to IDEA It concludes that the Court's
decision in Buckhannon will result in fewer out of court settlements and increased litigation for American school districts
under IDEA

II. BUCKHANNON BOARD AND CARE HOME.', INCORPORATED V.
WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
RESOURCES

A. Background Facts
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. (Buckhannon), operator of assisted living homes, failed an inspection with the
West Virginia Office of the State Fire Marshal for violating
12
\Vest Virginia Code, sections 16-5H-1 and 16-5H-2. These
statutes required "that all residents of residential board and
care homes be capable of 'self-preservation,' or capable of moving themselves 'from situations involving imminent danger,
13
such as fire."' : On October 28, 1997, after receiving a cease and
desist order that required closure of Buckhannon's board and
care facilities within 30 days, Buckhannon filed suit in the
Northern District of West Virginia against the state of West

Plaintiffs' Recovery for Attorneys' Fees, 87 ABA J. cl9, :-!9 (Sept. 2001).
9. !d.

1o.
11.
12.
U.

H>5 F. Supr. 2d 570 (2001).
2001 WL 10007~H (2001).
(Hhl8).
Buckhannon, J 21 S. Ct. at 18:{H (quoting W.Va. Code§§ 16-5H-1, l6-5H-2).
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Virginia, two of its agencies, and eighteen individuals on behalf
of itself and other similar board and care facilities. Buckhannon sought declaratory and injunctive relief claiming that the
"self-preservation" requirement of West Virginia law violated
14
the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA) and the
1
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). "
The District Court granted the Respondents' motion to dismiss the case as moot after the West Virginia Legislature successfully passed two bills eliminating the "self-preservation requirement." The court found "that the 1998 legislation had
eliminated the allegedly offensive provisions and that there
was no indication that the West Virginia Legislature would re16
peal the amendments."
Buckhannon requested attorneys' fees as the "prevailing
party" in the suit and asserted that it was entitled to such fees
under the "catalyst theory." The "catalyst theory" rests on the
idea that a plaintiff is a "prevailing party" where it is able to
achieve its desired result through a lawsuit which brings about
17
a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. Given the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had rejected the "catalyst theory" in S-1 and S-2 u. State Board of Education of North Caro18
lina, the District Court denied the motion for attorneys' fees,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The United States Supreme
.
. 19
Court gran ted cerboran.
B. Issue and Holding

By granting certiorari in Buckhannon, the Supreme Court
set out to resolve the disagreement between the Courts of Appeals20 on accepting the "catalyst theory," and whether the

14. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
16. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1838.
17. ld. at 1838, 183~).
18. 21 F.:ld 49 (1994).
19. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. u. W. Va. Dept. of llealth & Human Re·
.•ources, 5:-lO U.S. 1304 (2000).
20. At that time, the Courts of Appeals were split with the First, Second, Third,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits recognizing and upholding
the "catalyst theory." See, e.g. Stanton u. S. Berkshire Regl. Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 574,
577, n. 2 (1st Cir. 1999); Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1995); Baumgartner
v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 21 F3d 541, 546-550 (:ld Cir. 1996); Payne v. Bd. of Educ. 88
F.3d 392, :397 (6th Cir. 1996); Zinn v. Shalala 35 F.3d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1994); Little
Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulashi City Sch. Dist., #1, 17 F.ad 260, 26:3 n. 2 (8th Cir.1994);
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term "prevailing party" "includes a party that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree but has nonetheless achieved the desired result because
the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defent ,21
dan t 's conduc.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, rejecting the "catalyst theory," and held that in order
to award attorneys' fees under a fee-shifting statute like the
FHAA or ADA, a "prevailing party" must be "a party in whose
favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of dam22
ages awarded ... also termed successful party." Therefore, a
"prevailing party" must obtain a judgment on the merits or a
consent decree. The Court noted that "a consent decree does
not always include an admission of liability by the defendant,"
23
nor does the plaintiff have to recover damages. The key is
that both a consent decree and a judgment on the merits are a
"court-ordered 'change in the legal relationship between the
24
plaintiff and the defendant."' On the other hand, private settlements do not "entail the judicial approval and oversight involved in consent decrees. And federal jurisdiction to enforce a
private contractual settlement will often be lacking unless the
terms of the agreement are incorporated into the order of dis. l ,25
mlSSa.
The Court reasoned that to allow recovery under the "catalyst theory" would allow an award of attorneys' fees "where
there is not judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties .... A defendant's voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought
to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary judicial imprimaKilgour v. Pasadena 5;J F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1995); Beard u. Teska :31 F.3rl 942,
951-952 (lOth Cir. HJ94); Morris u. West Palm Beach 194 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir.
1999).
21. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at I 8:38.
22. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1839 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1145 (7th ed.
HJ99)). It is interesting to note that .Justices Scalia and Thomas, who both concurred
with the m;:Uority in Buckhannon, rely heavily on dictionaries to define terms in the
opinions they write. However, there is no "otlicial" dictionary of the Supreme Court and
many different ones are used. Samuel A. Thumma & ,Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Remains a Fortress: An Update 5 Green Bag 51, 52 & 54 (Autumn 200 l).
23. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1840.
24. ld. (quoting Tex. St. Teachers Assoc. v. Garland lndep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S.
782, 792 (1989)).
25. ld. at 1840, n. 7; see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 US 375
(1994).

333]

SHIFTING ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER IDEA

337

26

turon the change."
The Court felt that it was premature to say that without
the "catalyst theory", defendants would work to unilaterally
moot an action before judgment to avoid attorneys' fees. On the
contrary, the Court insisted that the "catalyst theory" creates a
disincentive for defendants to change their behavior which
27
may, in fact, be illegal.
C. The Dissent
Justice Ginsburg's dissent repeatedly referred to the precedent set by Federal Circuit Courts upholding and applying the
28
"catalyst theory" to fee-shifting statutes. She noted that "the
'catalyst rule' ... is a key component of the fee-shifting statutes
Congress adopted to advance enforcement of civil rights. Nothing in history, precedent, or plain English warrants the anemic
construction of the term 'prevailing party' as imposed by the
29
Court." In fact, prior to 1994, every Federal Court of Appeals
(except the Federal Circuit, which had not yet addressed the
issue) had held that a plaintiff in a situation like Buckhannon's
and his patients could obtain attorneys' fees if their suit was
the "catalyst" for the change they sought, regardless of whether
they obtained a judgment or consent decree. In 1994, the
Fourth Circuit strayed from the pack and decided in an en bane
ruling that a party had to have an enforceable decree or
10
agreement to prevail in a fee-shifting suit.:
Ginsburg claimed that the Court's decision will allow a defendant "to escape a statutory obligation to pay a plaintiffs
counsel fees, even though the suit's merit led the defendant to
abandon the fray, to switch rather than fight on, to accord the
plaintiff sooner rather than later the principle redress sought
81
in the complaint."
Justice Ginsburg also took exception to the court substituting Black's Law Dictionary's definition of "prevailing party" for
32
that of long-standing judicial precedent. "In prior cases, we
26. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1840.
27. ld. at l842-4J.
28. ld. at 1850.
2U. Id.
30. /d. at 1851-52 (referring to S-1 and S-2, 21 F.3d at 51).
:n. Jd. at 1850.
32. Lawrence A. Frolik & Melissa C. Brown, Adv. Elderly and Disabled Client ch.
7, 11 7.09 (2001); see c1lso Thumma, supra n. 22.
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have not treated Black's Law Dictionary as preclusively definitive; instead, we have accorded statutory terms, including legal
'terms of art,' a contextual reading." ~
Justice Ginsburg does acknowledge that certain fee-shifting
statutes do require court-ordered relief. However, many stat34
utes like the FHAA and ADA do not. In fact, in rejecting the
history of the "catalyst theory" pursuant to statutes like the
FHAA and ADA,
3 1

[t]he Court also rejected legislative history from the Civil
Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as support for the catalyst theory. However, the Senate Report accompanying§ 1988 could not have been clearer. "Parties may
be considered to have prevailed when they vindicate rights
through a consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief." The majority did not even mention an even clearer provision from the House Report: "[A]fter a complaint is filed, a
defendant might voluntarily cease the unlawful practice. A
court should still award fees even though it might conclude,
as a matte~ of equity, that no formal relief, such as injunction,
5
is needed."

Justice Ginsburg added that barring the "catalyst rule" may
lead to nuisance suits in an effort to recover attorneys' fees.
She stated, "[t]he catalyst rule provided no berth for nuisance
26
suits." Most plaintiffs will now be reluctant to settle out of
court. Ginsburg closed her dissent with the opinion that
"[f]idelity to the purpose [of civil rights] calls for court-awarded
fees when a private party's lawsuit, whether or not its settlement is re~istered in court, vindicates rights Congress sought
to secure.,.

a3. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 185:3.
34. Those that require a court order, howev.or, specifically state so. !d. (citing The
Prison Lilif?ation Reform Act of 1995, 42 !J.S.C. § 1997e(d)( I )(R)(i) (19~!4 e(l., Supp. IV)).
35. The Courts Address Golf Carts, Attorneys' Fees and Medicaid Causes of Action, 6 Advocate (newsletter of the Nat!. Assistive Tech. Advoc. Project) 1, 5 (Summer
2001) (av>!ilable at <http://www.nls.org/av/surnrnerOl.htm>) (quoting Buckhannon., 121
S. Ct. >1t 1857-58).
36. Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1859.
37. ld. at 1861.
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION ACT AS A FEE-SHIFTING STATUTE

A. How did we get to IDEA?
1. Public Law 94-142: The Education for All Handicapped
Children Act
3

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act s has a significant legislative history, beginning in 1958 with Congress'
passage of the Expansion of Teaching in the Education of Men39
tally Retarded Children Act. : This Act provided federal funds
40
for training teachers of the mentally retarded. Then, in 1965,
Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
11
(ESEA), which was designed to improve the quality of American public schools and to increase and strengthen educational
42
opportunities. The ESEA was amended eight months later to
include the first federal grants intended to assist state programs in educating children with disabilities in state-operated
43
or state-supported schools and institutions. Further amendments in 1966 provided grants to local schools rather than
44
state-operated schools and institutions. These amendments
also created the Bureau of Education for the Handicapped
(BEH) to administer all Office of Education programs for disabled children and the National Advisory Council, currently
15
known as the National Council on Disability.
Federal support for education of disabled children continued as the ESEA was amended again in 1967 to expand and
improve special education services through funding regional
resource centers, centers and services for deaf and blind chil-

:ls. 20 lJ .S.C. § 1400 et seq.
:39. Pub. L. No. 85-~!26, 72 Stat. 1777 (1%8).
40. Daniel II. M<dvin II, Student Author, The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities, -1-1 DePaul L. l{ev. 5~J!J, fi05 (1995).
41. Pub. L. No. S9-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965).
-12. l{ichanl L. llorne, The Education o/ Children and Youth with Special Needs:
What do the Laws Say?, #NlJJ5 NICIICY News Dig. (news digest ofthe Nat!. Info. Ctr.
for Children and Youth with Disabilities) :l (Oct. HJ96)

<www .n ichcy .org/puhs/newsd igest!nrl J 5txL htm>.
-1:1. Pub. L. No. SH-:ll :l, 7!J Stat. J I fi2 (I !J65).
44. Pub. L. No. SH-750, 80 Stat. lHJl (I!JG6).
45. Horne, supra n. 12, at :l.
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dren, expanded media programs, research, and a center to recruit teachers and disseminate information about education for
46
disabled children. However, the programs and services were
discretionary, and many public schools did not take advantage
47
ofthem. Congress attempted to help improve the effectiveness
of these programs in 1970 with another amendment to the
48
ESEA. This amendment consolidated the grant programs created under the ESEA, and the ESEA became known as the
49
Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA).
Congress attempted to assure safeguards against discrimination in the identification, evaluation, and placement of disabled students when it passed the Education Amendments of
50
1974. This law required states to set up a timetable for granting disabled students a full right to education. It also mandated integration of special education students into the general
education classroom. However, this law had little effect on education for the disabled because the bill lacked a program for
1
funding and a real method of enforcement. 5
Public Law 94-142, the Education for All Handicapped
52
Children Act (EAHCA), passed on November 29, 1975, was
the first real federal guarantee to a free and appropriate public
53
education (FAPE) for disabled children ages 3 to 21. Under
the EAHCA, special education gained its own life and finally
had its own source of funding and its own specially trained
54
teachers. The EAHCA corrected many of the problems found
in enforcing and funding the ESEA and its amendments. States
that received federal funds under the EAHCA had to submit a
plan that included the state's policies and procedures for educating disabled students. It further required an explanation of
how those policies and procedures complied with the Act. The
plan then had to be approved by the BEH. Approval obligated
the states, and therefore local school districts that received
46. Pub. L. No. 90-247, 81 Stat. 783 (1967).
47. Horne, supra n. 42, at 3.
48. Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970).
49. Charles J. Russo, Timothy E. Morse & Marian C. Glancy, Special Education:
A Legal History and Overuiew, 64 Sch. Bus. Affairs 8, 8 (Aug. 1998).
50. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 484 (1974).
51. Horne, supra n. 42, at 4.
52. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 73 (1975).
53. Horne, supra n. 42, at 4.
54. Sabrina Holcomb, Ed Amundson & Patti Ralabate, The New IDEA Survival
Guide, 10 (Nat!. Educ. Assn. of the U.S. 2000).
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state funds, to follow the provisions of the EAHCA. All states
but New Mexico submitted a plan so they could receive federal
funding. New Mexico soon learned, however, that under Section 504 (discussed below), it would be required to provide a
free, appropriate education to its disabled students regardless
of the EAHCA."" So New Mexico submitted a plan and received
6
federal funds for programs it was required to provide anyway. 5
Rights guaranteed by the EAHCA included "fairness, appropriateness, and due process in decision making about providing special education and related services to children and
57
youth with disabilities." The EAHCA provided safeguards in
placement and special education program decisions. School districts could no longer refuse service to disabled students or
force parents to place their children in special education pro58
grams of which they did not approve. In fact, parents could
now sue school districts through an administrative hearing
process for denial of their child's right to education and educational services.
The EAHCA included specific eligibility criteria for special
education services, which included non-discriminatory testing
59
60
and evaluation and individualized education plans (IEPs). It
required a free and appropriate education be provided in the
6
least restrictive environment (LRE) possible. The LRE was
55. N. M. Assn. for Retarded u. N.M., 678 F.2d 847 (lOth Cir. 1982).
56. Mitchell L. Yell, David Rogers & Elisabeth Lodge Rogers, The Legal History of
Special Education: What a Long, Strange Trip It's Been!, 19 Remedial and Spec. Educ.
219, 225 (July/Aug. 1998).
57. Richard A. Culatta & James R. Tompkins, Fundamentals of Special Educa·
tion: What Euery Teacher Needs to Know 15 (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1999).
58. Harvey B. Polansky, The Meaning of Inclusion: Is it an Option or a Mandate?,
60 Sch. Bus. Affairs 27, 27 (July 1994).
59. Yell, supra n. 56, at 225.
60. Culatta, supra n. 57, at 14. "An IEP is developed at a meeting among qualified
school officials, the child's teacher, the child's parents or guardians, and, when appropriate, the child. It must include, among other things, statements of the child's present
level of educational performance, annual goals for the child, the specific educational
services to be provided the child, and the extent to which the child will be able to participate in [general] education programs. School officials must convene a meeting at
least annually to review and, when appropriate, revise the IEP. As this court has recognized, 'the IEP is more than a mere exercise in public relations. It forms the basis for
a handicapped child's entitlement to an individualized and appropriate education.'
Thus the importance of the development of the IEP to meet the individualized needs of
the handicapped child cannot be underestimated." Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 967
F.2d 470 (11th Cir. 1992) affing 950 F.2d 688, 695 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Doe v. Ala.
St. Dept. of Educ., 915 F.2d 651, 654 (11th Cir. 1990)).
61. Culatta, supra n. 57, at 14; Yell, supra n. 56, at 225.
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defined as "appropriate placement along a continuum .... This
continuum [could] run from a self-contained, highly structured
environment, to inclusion in a [general education] classroom.
This placement [had to] allow the student to be educated as
2
much as possible with students who [were] not disabled."r; The
law also guaranteed related services such as transportation to
63
and from school, speech pathology, and physical therapy.

2. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 504
64

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Section 504 offered
broader and more general legal coverage as opposed to the narrow, specific coverage of educational rights for the handicapped
65
found in the EAHCA. Section 504 prevented discrimination
67
66
against disabled people in federally funded programs. This
included public education programs that were federally
68
funded.
Given the apparent overlap of [S]ection 504 and the EAHCA,
[legal] actions were brought to vindicate educational rights
under both acts. Several advantages were readily apparent in
bringing an action under [S]ection 504 for protections that
were also available under the EAHCA. One of the significant
differences was that attorneys' fees were available under
69
[S]ection 504 but not under the EAHCA. ...

62. Polansky, supra n. 58, at 28.
63. Bd. o{Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 187 n. 10 (1982).
64. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973).
65. Thomas F. Guernsey, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 42
U.S.C. §1988, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act o{1978: Statutory Interaction
Following the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 564
(1989).
66. Section 504 defined a disabled person as "[a]ny person who (i) has a physical
or men.t~l .impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major
hfe activities, (n) has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such
impairment." Horne, supra n. 42, at 4.
.
67. ~olcomb, supra n. 54, at 9. "[Nio otherwise qualified handicapped individual
m the Umted States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, or be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... " Kathleen S
Mon~ie, Stu?ent Author, The Right to a Special Education, 57 Mont. L. Rev. 151, 16i
(1996) (quotmg Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 701
·
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
68. Culatta, supra n. 57, at 14.
69. Guernsey, supra n. 65, at 567.
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Many of these suits were brought concurrently under 42
70
U.S.C. §1983 alleging deprivation of a federal right. Section
71
1983 also offered the remedy of attorneys' fees.
As a result, most suits alleging a violation of the EAHCA
additionally alleged violations of Sections 504 and 1983 so that
72
if the parents prevailed, they could obtain attorneys' fees.
However, lower courts were split on whether the EAHCA was
an "exclusive remedy or whether actions covered by the
EAHCA could also be brought concurrently under Sections
71
198~3 and 504." : The United States Supreme Court directly
74
addressed this issue in Smith v. Robinson and held that
"Congress intended the [EAHCA] to be the exclusive avenue
through which a plaintiff may assert an equal protection claim
75
to a publicly financed special education." Therefore, the
EAHCA could not be circumvented by claims under other stat76
utes, which allowed the recovery of attorneys' fees.

3. The Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986
In 1986, Congress passed an amendment to the EAHCA:
77
The Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, in reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Smith. This amendment allowed courts to award reasonable attorneys' fees and
costs to parents who were prevailing parties in lawsuits
78
against school districts who violate the EAHCA.
This
amendment also provided a real force behind the law as school
districts would be responsible not only for compliance with the
law but for all costs associated with their non-compliance so
that "the efficacy of seeing relief [no longer] hinged upon the
79
ability of ... parents ... to incur litigation expenses .... "
This provision caused a steep rise in special education litigation. Both parents and school districts were now more fre-

70. 42 U.S.C. § l!l8:J (I!J8:l).
71. Guernstey, supra n. 65, at 567.
72. ld.
n. ld. at 567-68.
74. 468 U.S. !!92 (1981).
75. Smith, 168 U.S. at 1009.
76. Guernsey, supra. n. 65, at 5fj8.
77. Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986).
78. YPII, supra n. 5G, at 22G; Guernsey, supra n. G5, at 5G8.
7!l. A. SPymour, IH, Creating Substantive Rights for Childrnt with Disabilities 3
Georgdown .J. on Fighting Poverty un, 187 (1996).
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quently represented by attorneys in their interactions with
each other, and the threat of losing at a due process hearing
caused many school districts to enter into out-of-court settlements. In fact, school districts still often settle cases that lack
merit based on a cost-benefit analysis that "does not warrant
spending public funds and dedicating administrative time nec. . t ,so
essary to 11hga
e.

B. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
81

Congress again amended the EAHCA in 1990
and
changed the name to the Individuals with Disabilities Educa82
tion Act (IDEA). There were few substantive changes to the
83
law, but the name change was significant because it "symbolized a rejection of the patronizing attitude associated with the
term 'handicapped' and demonstrated a renewed interest in the
84
education ofthe nation's disabled citizens."
The small legislative changes that did occur in IDEA included the addition of autism and traumatic brain injury as
80. Bridget A. Flanagan & Chad ,J. Graff, Federal Mandate to Education Disabled
Students Doesn't Cover Costs, 48 The Fed. Law. 22, 26-27 (Sept. 2000).
81. Pub. L. No.lOl-476, lOti Stat. 1103 (1990).
82. Monzie, supra n. 67, at 161; Horne, supra n. t12, at 5.
83. IDEA encompassed all previous legislation and amendments meaning that it
guaranteed the right to a free, appropriate education (FAPE) to all disabled students
ages three to twenty-one at public expense. A free and appropriate education was to be
given regardless of the severity of a student's disability. This education was to be based
on a complete and individual assessment of each disabled child's needs and performance levels. An IEP was to then be written based on the outcomes of the assessment
and was to include specific services to which the child was entitled and would receive
in an attempt to meet the goals of the child's IEP. To the maximum extent possible,
each disabled child was to be educated in the general education classrooms of his/her
own neighborhood school. Disabled students had the right to receive supplemental services like transportation to and from school and developmental, corrective, and other
supportive services including speech therapy, speech pathology and audiology, psychological services, cmmseling (including rehabilitative), physical therapy, occupational
therapy, therapeutic recreation, school health services, social work services in the
school, parent counseling and training, and medical diagnosis or evaluation.
Under IDEA, as had been guaranteed by previous legislation, parents of disabled students had the right to be involved in the decisions surrounding their child's assessment, placement, and IEP. Parents had to give consent before initial assessment could
even take place. Parents were to be notified of any changes in their child's program(s)
and be included in any meetings involving the writing of, or changes in, the lEP. A
parent's signature was required on the lEP before it could be implemented. Parents
also had the right to challenge or appeal in a due process procedure any decision made
by the school in regard to their child's assessment, placement, IEP, or the provision of a
free, appropriate education. Horne, supra n. 42, at 5.
84. Monzie, supra n. 67, at 162.
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classifications of students covered by the Act. Further changes
85
included a transition plan with goals to prepare the disabled
student to transition into higher education, employment,
and/or the community after graduation. This plan was required
86
by age sixteen as an addition to the IEP.
By 1996, however, many students were still not being educated in the general education classroom. The United States
Department of Education reported that only forty percent of all
general education classrooms contained special education stu87
dents. Some states encouraged inclusion more than others.
While this statistic did reflect a difference from statistics reported to Congress prior to the passage of the EAHCA in 1975,
it showed that the United States was a long way from granting
all disabled children the right to a free, appropriate public education with the maximum amount of time possible in a general
education classroom. So, in 1997, Congress issued significant
amendments to the IDEA. The result became known as IDEA
'97.88
The main idea of IDEA '97 mirrored research and court decisions that suggested that disabled students performed better
in the general education classroom (with supplemental aids
89
and services, if necessary). The largest changes made by
90
IDEA '97 involved the IEP process and team. Discipline was
91
also a significant topic added to IDEA '97. Significantly, IDEA
'97 attempted to alleviate the overly adversarial system of special education litigation by requiring states to offer mediation
between parents and schools as a method for resolving disputes
about IEPs and other issues related to special education as92
sessment, placement, or programming. Mediation could settle
claims without having to go through a due process hearing.
Even more telling was that the award of attorneys' fees was reR5. A transition plan is often called an Individualized Transition Plan or ITP.

Rf). Horne, supra n. 42, at 5; Lilliam Rangei-Diaz, Ensuring Access to the Legal
System for Children and Youth With Disabilities in Special Education Disputes, 27
Human Rights 17, 18 (Wintter 2000); Yell, supra n. 56, at 226.
R7. Kristen Girard Golomb & Peggy Ilammeken, Grappling with Inclusion Confusion?, Learning 49, 4~1 (,Jan./Feb. 19~16).
RR. Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (19~17).
R9. llolcomb, supra n. 51, at 10.
90. Dixie Snow Huefner, The Risks and Opportunitie., a{ the TRP Requirements
Under IDEA '.97, :J:l The ,J. of Spec. Educ. 195, 196 (2000).
~Jl. Yell, supra n. 56, at 22G.
92. Jd.
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IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF BUCKHANNON ON DUE PROCESS
HEARINGS UNDER THE INDMDUALS WITH DISABTI,ITIES
EDUCATION ACT.

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon on May
29, 2001, numerous District Court and Court of Appeals decisions since Buckhannon have applied the Court's decision to
some of the over 200 fee-shifting statutes.!=H However, only two
of those cases have dealt with the IDEA.

A. Federal IDEA Law
"As a result of the Court's opinion in Buckhannon, it is safe
to conclude that the "catalyst theory" may no longer be applied
in other cases involving disability legislation that use the 'prevailing party' langua~e, such as ... Individuals with Disabili9
ties Education Act." " Under the "catalyst theory," parents
were able to file suit, mediate a settlement with a school district, and still obtain attorneys' fees. But, Buckhannon seems to
encourage parents to skip the mediation process unless they
9:1. "In any action or proceeding brought under this sectiDn, the court, in its dis·
cretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a
child with a disability who is the prevailing party." 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(:1)(B) (West 2001).
94. See Sanner, supra n. 8, at :J9. Por a list of fee-shifting statutes such as the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title !11 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title Vll of the Civil
Rights Act of 1.964; Privacy Protection Act of 1[)80, National Ilousing Art, Securities Ex·
change Act of 1978, Age Discrimination in Employment Act ol 1967, de., see Marek v.
Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 44-50 (1985) (as cited in Buckhannon, 121 S. Ct. at 1839). The
cases involving fee-shifting statutes which have been decided sinw Buckhannon include Burt v. County of Contra Costa, 2001 WL 11:154:33 (N.D. Cal.) (based on claims
under Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U .S.C. §§ 1~181 & 198:3); Silekis v.
Perryman, 2001 WL 96550:1 (N.D. Ill.) (based on claims purswmt to the Equal Access to
,Justice Act); Hispanics United v. Village of Addison, 1G7 1<'. Supp. 962 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
(based on claim;; for violating the FcLir llousint? Act, 12 lJ.S.C. ~~ 1~181-8:3, and the
Equal Protection Clause); Aynes v. Space Guard Prods., Inc., 201 F.R.D. 115 (S.D. Indiana 200 1) (based on violations of Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act);
Bruce v. Wkly. World News, 2001 WL 12G6l:ll (D. Mass.) (baser! on claims under the
Copyright Act); Sys. Mgt., Inc. v. Loiselle, 151 F. Supp. 2rl HIG) (D. Mass. 2001) (awarding attorneys fees under the fee-shifting provision of the Racheteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); Fish v. St. Cloud State U., 2001 WL fiG7771l (D. Minn.) (granting attorneys' f(~es based on pelilion as prevailing parly under Title Vll); lleavy
Construction Lumber, Inc. v. Intl. Bhd. oj" Teamsters, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12178
(E.D.N.Y.) (claims for attorneys' fees under the ],abor Relations MrLnagement Act).
95. John W. Parry, Supreme Court Rules in Martin, Penry, and nuckhannon.
Cases, 25 Mental & Physical Disability L. J{ptr. 517, fj J H (200 I).
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can get the agreement ordered by consent decree. Instead, parents will favor going to due process hearing so that they may
recover attorneys' fees as the "prevailing party."
The real consequence of Buckhannon is unclear, however.
96
Jose v. Joliet Township High School District 204 demonstrates this lack of clarity. Jose was filed with the District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, as a demand for attorneys' fees based on "prevailing party" status under the Indi97
viduals with Disabilities Education Act. Defendant moved for
98
a judgment on the pleadings.
On November 1, 2000, Plaintiffs had filed for a due process
hearing for denial of specialized instruction. Shortly thereafter,
the parties participated in mediation and reached an agreement that was read into the record before a hearing officer. As
a result, Jose received the educational services demanded. Soon
99
thereafter, Plaintiffs filed this suit.
The court held that despite the fact that no due process
hearing being held, no evidence being presented, and no finding or order by a hearing officer, the reading of the mediation
agreement into the record before the hearing officer leaves
open the possibility of the plaintiff being the "prevailing party"
under the definition in Buckhannon. Therefore Defendant's
100
motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied.
The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York made it clear in J.S. & M.S. v. Ramapo Central
School District that the difference between Jose and a case that
is settled purely based on mediation or settlement negotiations
is that the agreement in Jose was read into the hearing officer's
101
record.
In J.S., the District participated in three days of an administrative hearing where some evidence was presented, but the
District agreed to the parents' demands and settled the case before the end of the hearing. The settlement agreement was
never read into the record of the hearing officer nor was the
hearing officer asked to render an opinion on the case. Thus the
96.
97.
statute).
9H.
99.
I 00.
101.

2001 WL 10007:-!4.
20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; 20 U.S.C. §

.Jose, 2otll WL l oon4 at 1.
Td.
Jd. at 2.
.J.S. & M.S., 1G5 F. Supp. 2d at 576.

1415(i)(:~)(B)

(West 2001) (Fee-shifting
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parents had nothing within the definition of Buckhannon that
would allow them to be deemed a "prevailing party." The District Court held they were not entitled to recover attorneys'
102
fees.
IDEA encourages school districts to engage in mediation as
a part of the process of resolving school or parent concerns regarding special education services for a child. In fact, in their
capacities as educational agencies, states, counties, and dis. . avm'l a bl e. 103
tricts must rna k e med mtwn
Jeffrey White, associate general counsel for the American
Trial Lawyers Association, says "[i]ronically, [Buckhannon]
may force some claimants into litigation rather than allow an
104
informal settlement,"
thwarting the effectiveness and purpose ofiDEA '97.
Prominent parent/special education advocates and websites
encourage parents who settle with the school district to get the
district to admit in writing that there has been a change in
their relationship and to agree to paying attorneys' fees. If the
district will not agree to this~ then the parent is encouraged to
10
go to court to obtain relief. · Thus, Buckhannon places school
districts in a difficult position. They must either agree to admit
there has been a change in legal relationship and pay attorneys' fees or accrue the costs of going to a due process hearing
even if they are willing to settle out of court.
Some organizations urge parents to add a claim for damages in hopes that even if a school district changes their cur106
rent practice, there will still be a retroactive claim.
They
warn that "[t]he potential impact of Buckhannon can be devastating. Defendants may now have the ability to string a plaintiff along during the course of litigation only to unilaterally
provide all the relief a plaintiff seeks on the eave of trial. Such
tactics would eliminate the right to fees for all the time spent

102. [d.
103. 20 U .S.C.§ l115(e)(l) (West 20()1).
104. Thomas Scarlett, Supreme Court Limits Reimbursement o{Attorney Fees Under Federal Statutes, Trial 16, 16 (Aug. 1, 200 1).
105. See e.g. Reed Martin, Could You 'Prevail' in Your Lawsuit but 'Lose' Your At·
turney's Fees and Costs? You Need to Understand How to Deal with. a New U.S. Supreme Court Case, Buckhannon v. West Virginia IIHR
<http://www.reedmartin.com/buckhannonvwestvirginiahhr.html> (accessed Sept. 17,
2001).
106. N atl. Assistive Tech. Advoc. Project, supra n. 35, at 6.
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107

on the case."
The Practising Law Institute (P.L.I.), in its Handbook Series on Litigation and Administrative Law, urges attorneys
who are working with a strong case to move forward on the
merits. Therefore the court will not be able to prove mootness if
a change in the relationship or defendant's conduct occurs during the course of litigation. Otherwise, the attorney should try
108
to settle with an agreement which includes attorneys' fees. It
also appears, as in Jose and J.S. & M.S., that if a settlement
agreement is enforced by a consent decree, it too will be the ba109
sis for awarding attorneys' fees.
Clearly, parents who feel their child's rights have been violated under IDEA will be more eager to go to a hearing or have
a settlement agreement enforced by a consent decree in order
to obtain attorneys' fees. School districts will likely volunteer to
include attorneys' fees in the settlement agreement in exchange for not having the settlement agreement enforced by
consent decree and thus avoid paying full attorneys' fees and
110
the cost oflitigating that matter in court.

B. State IDEA Law
There is some speculation as to how Buckhannon will apply
111
to state special education suits. However, "state statutes and
regulations must meet the federal requirements as outlined in
112
[IDEA '97]." And state courts must comply with the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, it is unlikely
that state fee-shifting statutes will be treated any differently
than the federal statutes upon which Buckhannon is based.
However, state laws have yet to be amended based on Buckhannon, nor are there any published state hearing office decisions that reflect how it will affect state fee-shifting statutes.
107. Id.
108. Richard A. Rothschild, Litigating Section 1988 Attorneys' Fees, 666 P.L.I.
Litig. & Admin. Prac. Course Handbook Series 7, 12 (Oct.-Nov. 2001).
lO!J . .Scarlett, supra n. 104, at 16.
110. Richard Talbot Seymour, Recent Decisions on Monetary Relief, SG016 ALIABA CLE, ALJ-ABA Course of Study 1081, I 140 (,July 2G-28, 20(ll)
111. Draft Firm Letter from Miller, Brown & Dannis to Governing Board Members, Superintendents, Student Services Directors, Special Education Directors and
Selpa Directors Re: The United States Supreme Court Rejects the "Catalyst Theory'' as
the Basis for Seeking Attorneys' Fees Under the ADA and FHAA (dated ,June 22, 2001;
on file with author).
J 12. Yell, ,;upra n. !16, at 227.
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There are some commentators and practitioners, like Richard A. Rothschild of the Western Center on Law and Poverty,
113
who believe that fees will still be available in state court. He
refers to the California Code of Civil Procedure, section 1021.5,
which allows recovery of attorneys' fees by a successful party
"in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an im114
portant right affecting the public interest."
V. CONCLUSION

The full effect of Buckhannon has yet to be seen, particularly for IDEA. Practitioners and advocates recommend abandoning private settlements in special education due process
hearings in order to preserve the right to be awarded attorneys'
fees. Therefore, it is likely that Buckhannon will result in fewer
out-of-court settlements and increased litigation for American
school districts under IDEA. Parents will not be willing to mediate or settle without having the agreement endorsed by a
hearing officer or court of law. Additionally, school districts will
press for private settlements to avoid the necessity of paying
attorneys' fees. However, in an effort to avoid the costly hearing process, school districts will likely add attorneys' fees to
their settlement agreements in hopes of settling at an amount
closer to nuisance value rather than risk a hearing that might
result in liability for all attorneys' fees. Surely, these viewpoints in direct opposition to each other will inevitably result in
increased involvement by attorneys on both sides.

Jennifer R. Rowe

113. Rothschild, supra n. 108, at 11.
114. Cal. Civ. P. Cod"§ 1021.5 (West 2001 ).

